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the benefit to be gained from allowing the free dissemination of infor-
mation and commentary far outweighs the possible economic harm to
the copyright owner. The public's right to be informed must be the
ultimate concern. "We cannot recognize copyright as a game of chess
in which the public can be checkmated.
9 7
STEVEN L. HOARD
Corporations-Singer v. Magnavox Co.: An Expansion of
Fiduciary Duty in Freezeout Mergers Under the Delaware
Long-Form Merger Statute
Under the law of some states a corporation holding a majority eq-
uity interest in another company may merge the two corporations and
provide in the merger agreement that certain shareholders be paid cash,
rather than securities in the resulting entity, for their interest in the old
corporation.' In these mergers, denominated "freezeouts,"2 the fiduci-
ary duties governing the relationship between majority and minority
stockholders are rooted in state law In Singer v. Magnavox Co.,4 a
recent decision concerning shareholder fiduciary duties, the Delaware
97. Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble, 379 F.2d 675, 679 (Ist Cir. 1967).
1. See, e.g., DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 251 (1974 & Cum. Supp. 1977); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§
901, 902 (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1977).
2. Freezeouts can occur in various contexts. For example, merger freezeouts include the
situation in which the controlling shareholders of a public corporation who wish to "go private"
form a second company and capitalize it with their equity interest in the public corporation. This
new "parent" then merges with its public subsidiary with the terms of the merger providing for the
elimination of the equity interest of the minority, often on a cash-out basis. A second type of
freezeout occurs when one corporation, by tender offer or otherwise, attempts to acquire the ma-
jority interest in a business with which it was previously unaffiliated. After the requisite propor-
tional interest is obtained, the acquiring corporation merges the acquired company with itself or
its wholly-owned subsidiary, the terms of the merger providing for the elimination of the minority
shareholders of the target corporation. See Greene, Corporate Freeze-Out Mergers: A Proposed
Analysis, 28 STAN. L. REv. 487, 491-96 (1976).
3. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977), in which the Supreme Court held
that in short-form mergers the fiduciary relationship between stockholders is a matter of state
concern. Specifically, Santa Fe rejected the contention that § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1976), and rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977), require a proper
business purpose to exist before a short-form merger comporting with state law will be valid under
federal law. The Court suggested that the reasoning behind its holding is also applicable to long-
form mergers. 430 U.S. at 478.
4. 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
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Supreme Court held that it is a breach of fiduciary duty under state law
for a controlling shareholder to cause such a merger through utilization
of Delaware's long-form merger statute' when the sole purpose of the
merger is to cash out minority stockholders.
6
The controversy in Singer began in 1974 when North American
Philips Corporation (North American) incorporated a wholly-owned
subsidiary, North American Philips Development Corporation (Devel-
opment), for the purpose of making a tender offer for the outstanding
common shares of Magnavox. After overcoming the initial resistance
of the Magnavox directors,7 the offer succeeded with Development ob-
taining approximately 84.1% of outstanding Magnavox common stock.
Development next incorporated a subsidiary, T.M.C. Development
Corporation (T.M.C.), and proposed to effect a merger between T.M.C.
and Magnavox under the long-form merger provision of the Delaware
Code. The Magnavox board unanimously approved the proposed
merger agreement,' which provided that the remaining public stock-
holders of Magnavox would be "cashed-out."9
5. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 251 (1974 & Supp. 1977). This section is the primary merger provi-
sion of the Delaware Code. It provides that two or more Delaware corporations may merge into
a single corporation or consolidate into a new entity. The provision requires that the board of
directors of each corporation approve an agreement that stipulates the merger terms and that this
agreement subsequently be approved by shareholders holding a majority of outstanding shares
entitled to vote on the matter. To be included in the merger agreement are provisions regarding
the manner in which shares of the constituent corporation will be converted or eliminated.
Section 25 l(b)(4) provides that the merger agreement will state:
[T]he manner of converting the shares of each of the constituent corporations into shares
or other securities of the corporation surviving or resulting from the merger or consolida-
tion and, if any shares . . . are not to be converted. . . the cash, property, rights or
securities of any other corporation which the holders of such shares are to receive ....
Id § 251(b)(4) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
The long-form statute is currently more permissive than as originally written with respect to
the types of consideration that can be paid for a stockholder's interest in a premerger corporation.
For a brief history of the development of Delaware's long-form statute, see Balotti, The Elimina-
tion of the Minority Interests by Mergers Pursuant to Section 251 of the General Corporation Law of
Delaware, 1 DEL. J. CORP. L. 63 (1976).
6. 380 A.2d at 980. The supreme court also interpreted the Delaware Securities Act, DEL.
CODE tit. 6, § 7303 (1974), to be a state Blue Sky law applicable only to transactions subject to
Delaware jurisdiction. It held that out-of-state transactions are not covered by the Act even if the
company involved were incorporated in Delaware. 380 A.2d at 981-82.
7. The opposition was suspended after agreement had been reached to increase the original
per-share offer and to contract with 16 Magnavox officers for two-year employment contracts.
See 380 A.2d at 971.
8. Id. at 972. At this time Development effectively controlled the Magnavox board: four of
the nine directors were also directors of North American and three others had employment con-
tracts.
9. The cash-out price was $9.00 per share and book value was estimated at $10.16 per share.
This discrepancy was one ground on which the merger was attacked. See id. at 972. Cash
freezeouts are discussed in note 2 supra.
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After the required stockholders' vote, plaintiffs, minority share-
holders in Magnavox, filed suit seeking nullification of the consolida-
tion as well as compensatory damages. They alleged that the merger
was fraudulent because it did not serve any business purpose other than
the forced exclusion of public stockholders from an equity position in
Magnavox, that the price offered was inadequate and therefore consti-
tuted a breach of duty by Development, the majority shareholder, and
that the merger violated the antifraud provision of the Delaware Secur-
ities Act.10 The lower court determined that plaintiffs had failed to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 1 The supreme court
reversed, holding that a majority shareholder owes a fiduciary duty to a
minority and that it is a breach of that duty when a long-form merger is
effected for the sole purpose of eliminating a noncontrol interest.12
Rather, before a minority may be eliminated in a long-form merger, a
proper business purpose for the combination must exist. 13
This holding is significant because of its emphasis on and redefini-
tion of the fiduciary duty of controlling shareholders. Delaware's long-
form merger statute does not explicitly require, and the state's courts
generally have not implied, the necessity of a proper business purpose
as a precondition of the validity of any merger.' 4  The requirement
10. 380 A.2d at 972.
11. See 367 A.2d 1349, 1358, 1362 (Del. Ch. 1976).
12. 380 A.2d at 980. The fiduciary duty was predicated, the court found, on the majority's
responsibility toward plaintiffs' investment interest in Magnavox. Significantly, the court held
that this interest extended not merely to the value of the investment but also to its form. There-
fore, it found that offering a minority merely a fair price for its shares in a cash-out merger would
not satisfy the fiduciary obligation, and that defendant's duty was not lessened by the availability
to the minority of the right to elect an appraisal. For a discussion of statutory appraisal rights, see
notes 19 & 20 and accompanying text infra.
13. See 380 A.2d at 978-79. The court did not find it necessary to determine which corpora-
tion's business interest should be served in the merger. But in Tanzer v. International Gen. In-
dus., Inc., 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977), a case decided after Singer and involving a cash-out long-
form merger, the Delaware Supreme Court held that one looked to the business rationale of the
parent corporation. The court, however, objected to phrasing the standard in terms of business
purpose since it is the parent corporation's status as a stockholder that gives it the right to vote its
own interest. Id. at 1123. Although this distinction is useful for a conceptual understanding of
the Tanzer decision, its practical importance in determining the legality of mergers seems prob-
lematical because some bona fide business purpose is a prerequisite to merger validity. See id. at
1124.
14. The Singer court cited two unreported Delaware cases that according to the court sug-
gest that a business justification is required in long-form merger cases. 380 A.2d at 975 n.5 (dis-
cussing Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus., Inc., No. 4945 (Del. Ch. Dec. 23, 1975); Pennsylvania
Mut. Fund, Inc. v. Todiunter Int'l, Inc., No. 4845 (Del. Ch. Aug. 5, 1975)).
One federal court also has discussed business purpose in the context of a long-form merger.
In Grimes v. Donaldson, Lufkin, & Jenrette, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 1393 (N.D. Fla. 1974), aft'd, 521
F.2d 812 (5th Cir. 1975), plaintiff sought to prevent a merger between two Delaware corporations
on various grounds, including an allegation that the merger served no business function. Apply-
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that there be a business purpose other than the elimination of a minor-
ity interest in long-form mergers runs counter to the general trend of
Delaware statutory and case law which has, in general, encouraged
consolidations by placing progressively fewer restraints on majority
shareholders desiring to effect corporate mergers. 15
The existence of merger provisions in the Delaware Code has been
considered by courts to be evidence of a state policy in favor of facili-
tating mergers. 16  Because the merger statutes are considered part of
every corporate charter, stockholders purchase shares with notice of the
provisions, a fact courts have cited in dismissing merger challenges. 7
This interpretation of the policy of the statutes has meant that fewer
limitations have been placed on controlling shareholders when making
merger decisions than have been placed on them when making other
decisions regarding corporate assets or functions.' 8
ing Delaware law, the court entered judgment for defendants, finding that there was a valid busi-
ness purpose for the merger but also stressing that a minority did not possess an absolute right to
its shares; therefore, it could be cashed out for a fair price. Id. at 1403.
While the Grimes court purported to apply Delaware law, it never made a specific finding
that the state law required a business purpose. Rather, the court apparently considered the busi-
ness purpose of the merger to be relevant on the basis of Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co., 490 F.2d
563 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 844 (1974), a case in which the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit construed a Georgia statute similiar to Delaware's long-form provision. The Bryan court
concluded that under Georgia law a control group could not force a merger for the sole purpose of
eliminating a minority shareholder. Unlike Singer and Grimes, Bryan did not involve the attempt
of one corporation to take over another, rather, it involved the attempt of several shareholders of a
close corporation to freeze out another shareholder. For an analysis of the Grimes court's appli-
cation of the Bryan business purpose test, see Comment, Corporate Freeze-Outs Effected by
Mferger: The Search for a Rule, 37 U. PrTr. L. REv. 115, 121-24 (1975).
On the other hand, some cases and commentators have asserted that business purpose is not a
consideration under Delaware's merger law. See MacCrone v. American Capital Corp., 51 F.
Supp. 462, 466 (D. Del. 1943); Bruce v. E.L. Bruce Co., 40 Del. Ch. 80, 174 A.2d 29, 30 (1961);
Arsht, Minority Stockholder Freezeouts Under Delaware Law, 32 Bus. LAW. 1495, 1497 (1977);
Balotti, supra note 5, at 77.
15. See notes 24-34 and accompanying text infra.
16. See, e.g., Federal United Corp. v. Havender, 24 Del. Ch. 318, 11 A.2d 331 (1940); Bruce
v. E.L. Bruce Co., 40 Del. Ch. 80, 174 A.2d 29 (1961).
17. See Federal United Corp. v. Havender, 24 Del. Ch. 318, 334, 11 A.2d 331, 338 (1940).
18. These nonmerger cases often involve majority shareholder action relating to the control
of corporate assets and internal corporate functioning. An early decision held that while the
decision to sell corporate assets is a shareholder determination, the terms of the sale must be fair
to the corporation. See Allied Chem. & Dye Corp. v. Steel & Tube Co. of Am., 14 Del. Ch. 1, 11,
120 A. 486, 490 (1923). A subsequent case hypothesized that even if the terms of sale are fair, a
court of equity might enjoin a merger when a control group attempts to freeze out a minority by
selling corporate assets to themselves. See Allaun v. Consolidated Oil Co., 16 Del. Ch. 318, 323-
24, 147 A. 257, 260 (1929).
More generally, Delaware courts have held that corporate mechanisms may not be used to
perpetuate corporate control at another's expense. Thus, the court in Condec Corp. v.
Lunkenheimer Co., 43 Del. Ch. 353, 230 A.2d 769 (1967), cancelled an issuance of stock that was
designed to frustrate plaintiff's successful tender bid for a majority of defendant's outstanding
shares. See also Petty v. Peantech Papers, Inc., 347 A.2d 140 (Del. Ch. 1975); Yasik v. Wachtel,
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The liberal attitude displayed by courts toward mergers has been
reinforced by the existence of appraisal rights for stockholders who dis-
sent from a merger.' 9 To request an appraisal, a shareholder must
vote against the proposal and file a petition in court. The court then
determines the value of the dissenting stockholder's interest in the
premerger corporation. 20  This appraisal right is significant because it
has often been held to be an adequate remedy for a shareholder dissat-
isfied with a merger.21
The favorable predisposition toward corporate combinations,
however, has been tempered by various limitations on a control group's
right to force a merger in contravention of a minority's interest. Early
cases held that a merger would be enjoined when a minority estab-
lished that a control group had engaged in fraudulent practices.
Before the long-form statute provided for cash payments for eliminated
shares, a control faction could formulate unfavorable merger terms and
virtually assure that dissatisfied stockholders would invoke their ap-
praisal rights and be paid cash for their interests in the premerger com-
pany. Notwithstanding the appraisal remedy it was held that in the
presence of such fraud a court of equity would enjoin the merger.22
Moreover, courts went beyond the requirement of actual fraud and rec-
ognized a claim for relief based upon a showing of "constructive
fraud," a type of fraud that results from a reckless but nondeceptive
undervaluation of a minority's interest. 23
25 Del. Ch. 247, 17 A.2d 309 (1941). In Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437 (Del.
1971), Chris-Craft's technical compliance with Delaware law in changing the annual shareholders'
meeting date was held to be insufficient to prevent a preliminary injunction from issuing when the
change was designed to inhibit plaintiff's efforts to solicit proxies for a rival slate of directors. But
see American Hardware Corp. v. Savage Arms Corp., 37 Del. 59, 136 A.2d 690 (1957). The
above cases illustrate the principle that in non-merger situations, notwithstanding compliance with
technical statutory requirements, Delaware courts will carefully scrutinize majority shareholder
action to ensure that the noncontrol group is dealt with fairly.
19. See DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 262 (1974 & Cum. Supp. 1977).
20. The statute provides that the determination of value should exclude any increment in
value arising from the merger itself. Id. § 262(f) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
21. See note 28 iAfra.
22. See, e.g., Cole v. National Cash Credit Ass'n, 18 Del. Ch. 47, 156 A. 183 (1931).
23. See id. at 56-57, 156 A. at 187; accord, Porges v. Vadsco Sales Corp., 27 Del. Ch. 127,
133, 32 A.2d 148, 151 (1943); MacFarlane v. North Am. Cement Corp., 16 Del. Ch. 172, 157 A.
396 (1928). One court suggested that the discrepancy between actual and proffered value must
shock the court's conscience in order to reach the level of constructive fraud. See Bruce v. E.L.
Bruce Co., 40 Del. Ch. 80, 82, 174 A.2d 29, 30 (1961). In cases in which constructive fraud is
alleged in mergers involving previously unaffiliated corporations, it has been held that the burden
of proof is on the dissenting shareholders to show manifestly unfair terms. See Cole v. National
Cash Credit Ass'n, 18 Del. Ch. 47, 58, 156 A. 183, 188 (1931); c. Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel
Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293, 298, 93 A.2d 107, 109-10 (Sup. Ct. 1952) (burden of proof shifted in
interested mergers). For an illustration of some of the factors a court will consider in determining
1978]
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In Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp.,24 the seminal case on fiduci-
ary obligations of majority stockholders in interested mergers, the Del-
aware Supreme Court held that a corporation standing on both sides of
a merger has the burden of proving the "entire fairness" of it.2 5  The
phrase "entire fairness" was not expressly defined by the Sterling court,
but was employed as the standard to determine whether defendant cor-
poration had used its position to undervalue the minority's interest. In
equating fairness with value, however, there is no indication that the
Sterling court intended fairness to include the necessity of a proper
business purpose for the merger; indeed, other cases under Delaware
law have held that business necessity is not a consideration under the
state's merger statutes. 6
Subsequent cases involving interested long-form mergers have
been inconsistent in applying the fiduciary obligation enunciated in
Sterling. At times courts have not recognized the applicability of the
obligation to prove fairness,27 while other courts have diluted the im-
pact of Sterling by implying that the existence of statutory appraisal
mitigates a parent corporation's burden of establishing fairness.2 8 This
relative share valuation in proposed mergers, see Bastian v. Bournes, Inc., 256 A.2d 680, 683-84
(Del. Ch. 1969), aj'dper curiam, 278 A.2d 467 (Del. 1970).
24. 33 Del. Ch. 293, 93 A.2d 107 (Sup. Ct. 1952). Sterling involved a merger challenge in
which minority shareholders attacked the proposed share exchange ratio offered by the parent
corporation.
25. This fiduciary duty was derived from cases that had construed the duties of corporate
directors and officers toward the corporation and its shareholders. The theme that runs through-
out these cases is that officers and directors must deal fairly with the corporation and its share-
holders. Any actions by which these persons attempt to usurp corporate opportunities, bring
benefits solely to themselves, unfairly perpetuate their control over the corporation or favor one
class of stockholders over another is a breach of fiduciary duty. See, e.g., Kaplan v. Fenton, 278
A.2d 834 (Del. 1971); Dolese Bros. v. Brown, 39 Del. Ch. 1, 157 A.2d 784 (Sup. Ct. 1960); Guth v.
Loft, 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
26. See note 14 supra.
27. See Bruce v. E.L. Bruce Co., 40 Del. Ch. 80, 174 A.2d 29 (1961). Bruce involved an
interested merger in which a minority shareholder sought to enjoin the merger on the ground that
the proposed exchange ratio for shares was constructively fraudulent. The court dismissed the
complaint on the basis that the alleged value of plaintiff's interest was unrealistically high and
therefore constructive fraud had not been proven. The court implied that under the circum-
stances recourse to appraisal was adequate. Id. at 82, 174 A.2d at 30. In David J. Greene & Co.
v. Dunhill Int'l, Inc., 249 A.2d 427 (Del. Ch. 1968), however, the court followed Sterling, holding
that the minority shareholders' allegations of unfair valuation and usurpation of corporate oppor-
tunities by defendant parent corporation justified the issuance of a preliminary injunction. Bruce
was distinguished on the ground that the plaintiff in that case had apparently not brought the
applicability of Sterling to the court's attention. Id. at 431.
28. See David J. Greene & Co. v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 281 A.2d 30 (Del. Ch. 1971). In
Schenley the parent corporation conceded its obligation to establish fairness, but the court held
that the burden had been met when the parent had established that the price offered was not
fraudulent. Id. at 33. In so holding, the court reasoned that the parties were merely in a dispute
over value, and, because the court construed the rights of a minority stockholder in a long-form
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seeming reluctance to give full effect to the Sterling decision parallels
the Delaware Supreme Court's own interpretation of mergers under the
state's short-form merger statute.2 9 This provision provides for an ex-
pedited merger procedure when one corporation owns at least a 90%
interest in another company. Such mergers, involving one corporation
on both sides of the transaction, are by definition "interested." Yet in
Stauffer v. Standard Brands, Inc. 30 the supreme court, despite
plaintiff's allegations of constructive fraud, held that in short-form
mergers the statutory appraisal right is an adequate remedy when the
only relief sought is the monetary value of an interest.31 In making the
availability of appraisal dispositive of the minority's claim, the supreme
court in Stauffer was impliedly rejecting Sterling's requirement that in
an interested merger the majority must prove fairness. Furthermore,
the court in Stauffer noted that it would be difficult to foresee a short-
form merger that could be nullified for fraud.32 The Stauffer decision is
particularly significant because of one court's holding that due to the
presence in both the long- and short-form merger statutes of provisions
allowing for cash payments of eliminated interests,33 the rights of a mi-
nority shareholder in long-form mergers are no greater than those in
short-form mergers.34 Thus, prior to Singer it appeared that some Del-
aware courts were prepared to hold that because appraisal constitutes
an adequate and complete remedy a long-form cash-out merger could
not be enjoined for fraud.
In general, a review of statutory and case law reveals several ele-
ments of Delaware corporate law that have influenced courts in deter-
mining the legality of majority stockholder action in interested long-
merger to be no greater than those in short-form mergers, appraisal was an adequate remedy for
the dissatisfied stockholders. Id. at 33, 35.
The Sterling court had not specifically addressed the interrelationship between the appraisal
remedy and the fiduciary duty of a parent corporation. At a minimum, as the Schenley court
found, Sterling requires the controlling corporation to prove the absence of fraud. A more inter-
esting question is whether the Sterling court would have required the control shareholder in
Schenley to go beyond negating the plaintiffs fraud allegations and make a positive showing of
the fundamental fairness of the merger terms. The dismissal of the merger challenge by the
Schenley court indicates that that court impliedly rejected such a stringent formulation of majori-
ty fiduciary duty.
29. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 253 (1974 & Cum. Supp. 1977).
30. 41 Del. Ch. 7, 187 A.2d 78 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
31. Id. at 10-11, 187 A.2d at 80.
32. Id. But see Blraasch v. Goldschmidt, 41 Del. Ch. 519, 199 A.2d 760 (1964) (motion to
dismiss challenge to short-form merger denied when plaintiff alleged fraud by parent corpora-
tion).
33. See DEL. CODE tit. 8, §§ 251, 253 (1974 & Cum. Supp. 1977).
34. See David J. Greene & Co. v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 281 A.2d 30, 35 (Del. Ch. 1971).
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form mergers. Influencing merger approval is the view that merger
statutes reflect a public policy favoring mergers and, therefore, that
mergers should only be enjoined on the basis of supervening equities.35
This predisposition has been reinforced by the tendency to view the
appraisal right as an exclusive remedy36 and by legislative acts that
have both liberalized and reduced the distinctions between the long-
and short-form merger provisions.37 On the other hand, courts have
shown a reluctance to sanction the manipulation of corporate machin-
ery for the perpetuation of a control position.38 Moreover, courts have
generally recognized in all long-form mergers that majority sharehold-
ers owe a fiduciary duty to act fairly to minority stockholders and that
the obligation is strongest when the controlling shareholder is a parent
corporation.39
In assessing the validity of a long-form merger, particularly one in
which one party is interested, it is necessary to accommodate these con-
flicting decisional factors. Cases prior to Singer reveal that the conflict
between the factors was resolved by rejecting the necessity of close
scrutiny of interested mergers and adopting the view that a minority
was dealt with fairly whenever it was paid the fair value of its interest.40
Often, appraisal was cited as an appropriate mechanism to satisfy this
latter goal. Singer, in contrast, held that a stockholder has an interest
not only in the value of his shares but also in the form of his investment
and that therefore appraisal is not an appropriate remedy in a cash-out
merger under the long-form statute. The significance of this holding is
twofold. First, while there is a recognition that a minority's interest is
not inviolable, the Delaware Supreme Court found that it could only
be abrogated for a valid business purpose and that the elimination of a
minority solely to allow the majority unfettered control does not consti-
tute such a purpose. Second, the decision may be interpreted as reaf-
firming Sterling's emphasis on the fiduciary obligations of majority
stockholders, despite contrary trends in Delaware law. Thus, the court
expanded the fiduciary obligations of controlling shareholders in cash-
out mergers under the long-form statute through the imposition of a
requirement of proper business purpose, while it simultaneously em-
35. See cases cited notes 16 & 17 supra.
36. See note 28 supra.
37. See Balotti, supra note 5.
38. See note 18 upra.
39. See notes 27 & 28 supra.
40. See notes 27-34 and accompanying text supra.
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phasized that appraisal could not serve as a substitute for fiduciary
duty.
In requiring that a business purpose exist in a long-form merger in
which a minority is to be eliminated, the Singer court arguably did not
lay an adequate basis for its decision through analysis of Delaware stat-
utory law and prior decisions. The court relied heavily on a series of
nonmerger cases that stand for the proposition that a control faction
cannot perpetuate its position at the expense of a minority even when
the noncontrol group is paid a fair value for its interest." On the basis
of these decisions the Singer court held that it is a breach of fiduciary
duty in a long-form merger for a majority shareholder to freeze out a
minority without a business justification. The applicability of prior
merger cases that had either expressed or implied that business purpose
has no function in determining the validity of mergers under Delaware
law was rejected on the ground that none of those cases involved a
cash-out merger whose sole purpose was to eliminate a minority.42 In
its rejection of the applicability of prior merger law, however, the court
neglected to address the policy of liberality toward mergers that these
decisions exemplified. This leniency, in fact, seems to have tradition-
ally distinguished the application of fiduciary standards in merger cases
from the application of such principles in other areas of corporate
life.4 3 The Singer court's reliance on nonmerger case law, therefore,
tends to obscure the true significance of the opinion, because it conceals
the degree to which the case both strengthens and expands the fiduciary
obligations recognized by the Sterling court. Nevertheless, the impor-
tance of Singer to Delaware law will not go unrecognized because the
inclusion of business purpose as a component of fiduciary duty in long-
form corporate mergers is a significant departure from prior law.44
41. See 380 A.2d at 976-77. See note 18 supra for a discussion of Delaware's treatment of
shareholder fiduciary duties in nonmerger situations.
42. See 380 A.2d at 978.
43. See Balotti, supra note 5, at 74-77.
44. The court's opinion left some questions unanswered. The major unanswered question
was whose business purpose should be determinative of legality; this problem was resolved in
Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus., Inc., 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977), drcussedin note 13 supra.
Moreover, while some language in Singermight be construed as requiring a business purpose in
short-form mergers, the question was not decided. See 380 A.2d at 979-80. Short-form mergers
cannot automatically be presumed to involve the same fiduciary duties as long-form mergers.
The differences in the provisions governing short- and long-form mergers might indicate a legisla-
tive judgment that the rights attaching to minority stock ownership are more clearly outweighed
by corporate interests when a parent owns over 90% of its subsidiary than when a lesser interest is
held. This possibility, however, leads to the anomaly that in some instances fiduciary duty is
inversely related to degree of ownership.
1978]
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Although Singer v. Magnavox Co. does not harmonize with prior
Delaware merger law, it cannot be condemned as improperly decided.
By injecting considerations of business purpose into determinations of
merger validity, the supreme court simply recognized a factor not pre-
viously deemed important under state law. The propriety of this equi-
table decision should be assessed in terms of competing policies that
favor both mergers and protection of the investment interests of minor-
ity shareholders who wish to retain their stock in a corporation. Ac-
cordingly, the Singer decision clearly does not frustrate the state's
substantive policy of corporate flexibility that is revealed in the case
law. A corporation may still effect a merger and eliminate a minority's
equity interest with a cash or other payment, subject only to the qualifi-
cations of fairness and a proper business objective. And, while some
might contend that a minority shareholder should only be entitled to
the value of his interest,45 it seems reasonable that an individual, hav-
ing made an investment, should not be forced to sell out absent some
superior interest.46 The inadequacy of merely receiving share value is
particularly apparent in light of the possibility of majority abuse in the
valuation of a noncontrol interest and in deficiencies in statutory ap-
praisal rights.47 The requirement of a business purpose does not, of
course, eliminate the problems in either majority valuation or statutory
appraisal, but it does help assure that these mechanisms will not be
utilized to frustrate the legitimate investment goals of minority stock-
holders.48
ROBERT S. PIERCE
45. See Arsht, supra note 14. It might be reasonable to conclude that a majority share-
holder's interest varies according to the type of merger involved. A distinction might be made
between freezeouts of noncontrolling stockholders in close corporations versus those situations in
which the freezeout is incident to an acquisition attempt. A business requirement might be more
reasonable in the former type of merger. See Greene, supra note 2, at 499-502.
46. See Note, Elimination of Minority Share Interest by Merger A Dissent, 54 Nw. U.L.
REv. 629 (1959).
47. Various flaws have been identified in construing a right of appraisal as a complete rem-
edy. For example, factors necessary to fairly evaluate an interest may be concealed; the costs
incurred in appraisal reduce its value as an option; and when the value of an interest is.specula-
tive, conservative results may be expected. See Vorenburg, Exclusiveness of the Dissenting Stock-
holder's Appraisal Right, 77 HARv. L. Rev. 1189, 1201-05 (1964). Moreover, when the market
value of an interest is likely to be determinative of an appraisal decision, the likelihood of a
freezeout can depress share value. See Greene, supra note 2; Solomon, Going Private. Business
Practices, Legal Mechanics, Judicial Standards and Proposalsfor Re/orm, 25 BUFFALO L. Rev.
141, 158 (1975).
48. For two recent cases giving broad scope to Singer, see Young v. Valhi, Inc., 382 A.2d
1372 (Del. Ch. 1978) (proposed long-form cash-out merger between Valhi and its subsidiary en-joined because Valhi's parent corporation, Contran, breached its duty of fairness in proposing the
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